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Abstract. Although PROLOG is a programming language based on techniques from theorem 
proving, its use as a base for a theorem prover has not been explored until recently (Stickel, 
1984). In this paper, we introduce a PRoLoGbased deductive theorem proving method for proving 
theorems in a first-order inductive theory representable in Horn clauses. The method has the 
following characteristics: 
(1) It automatically partitions the domains over which the variables range into subdomains 
according to the manner in which the predicate symbols in the theorem are defined. 
(2) For each of the subdomains the prover returns a lemma. If the lemma is true, then the 
target theorem is true for this subdomain. The lemma could also be an induction hypothesis for 
the theorem. 
(3) The method does not explicitly use any inductive inference rule. The induction hypothesis, 
if needed for a certain subdomain, will sometimes be generated from a (limited) forward chaining 
mechanism in the prover and not from employing any particular inference rule. 
In addition to the backward chaining and backtracking facilities of PROLOG, our method 
introduces three new mechanisms-skolemization by need, suspendedeva/uation, and limitedforward 
chaining. These new mechanisms are simple enough to be easily implemented or even incorporated 
into PROLOG. We describe how the theorem prover can be used to prove properties of PROLOG 
. programs by showing two simple examples. 
1. Introduction 
PROLOG is a powerful and versatile programming language based on theorem 
proving techniques such as unification and resolution. Many of its implementations 
perform inferences at a much higher speed than genera1 purpose theorem provers. 
Despite this fact PROLOG has not been successfully used as a theorem prover. Some 
of the reasons for this are that PROLOG is restricted in expressive power (Horn 
clause based), and has other obstacles such as the lack of occur checks and the 
inability to prove properties in which variables are universally quantified to range 
over recursively constructed domains. 
Stickel (in [26]) gave an approach for using PROLOG as a general theorem prover. 
It included a genera1 inference rule which provides PROLOG with the ability of 
dealing with non-Horn clauses (and, consequently, does not use the closed world 
assumption [23]), as well as mechanisms for occur checks.’ The universal quan- 
tification problem was handled in [26] in a standard way-by skolemizing all of 
’ The occur check problem was discussed in detail in [22] 
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the universally quantified variables right at the beginning of the proof process. In 
[20] Lloyd and Topor show the soundness of the negation as failure rule and 
SLDNF-resolution for extended logic programs in which the body of a clause (and 
a query) can be an arbitrary first-order formula. They show how the increased 
expressibility of extended programs and goals can be implemented in a PROLOG 
system with a sound implementation of negation as failure rule. In [20] universal 
quantification is handled by completing the extended programs by adding a closure 
rule which lists the constants belonging to the domain of the universally quantified 
variables. Neither of the above approaches, however, works for proving inductive 
theorems, i.e., theorems which are only true in the initial model defined by the Horn 
clauses. Such properties often arise when proving properties of programs defined 
on recursive data structures such as Lists. 
In this paper we introduce an inductive theorem proving method to provide a 
more satisfactory answer to the above problem. This is done by supplementing the 
backward chaining mechanism of PROLOG with three new mechanisms-skolemiza- 
tion by need, suspended evaluation, and limitedforward chaining. The new mechanisms 
introduced are simple enough to be easily implemented or even incorporated into 
PROLOG. We demonstrate the use of the theorem prover for verifying PROLOG 
programs and proving properties of data types. 
Our theorem proving method has the following characteristics. 
(1) It can be used for proving inductive properties in which the variables range 
over recursively constructed domains. 
(2) It automatically divides the domain(s) of the universally quantified variable(s) 
into a finite number of subdomains. Each subdomain is characterized by the 
instantiations (for the quantified variables) that the theorem prover returns. 
(3) It proves the validity of the proposition for each subdomain separately. For 
each subdomain, it returns a Lemma the validity of which guarantees the validity 
of the proposition for that subdomain. The Lemma could be the literal true, or the 
induction hypothesis for the subdomain, or an arbitrary (Horn clause) formula. In 
the first two cases the Lemma is already proved, in the third case the Lemma can 
be fed back (by the user) to the prover again. Thus, the method does not use any 
explicit inductive inference rule. 
(4) Also, since the method is based on subgoal reduction, the prover always 
terminates. 
The method has the following restrictions. The proposition to be proved must be 
in the form of a Horn clause in which the antecedents are arbitrary literals, but the 
consequent is a PROLOG equality predicate. The second restriction is that every 
(n + 1)ary predicate P(x, , . . . , x,) that appears in the proposition is defined as a 
total n-ary function with respect to its last argument. There are methods [4] to check 
the second condition. 
One way of building the theorem prover is to integrate it into the environment 
provided by a PROLOG system. The extended environment, besides inheriting the 
normal features of PROLOG, will incorporate all the new mechanisms proposed in 
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the paper. In such an environment a universally quantified proposition prop(X) is 
proved by typing it in as a query. A simpler way of building the theorem prover is 
to implement it as a predicate on top of a PROLOG interpreter. In such a case a 
property is proved by defining it as a set of PROLOG clauses, and then invoking the 
theorem proving predicate. A preliminary implementation of our method has been 
completed using the second approach. We maintain the perspective implied by the 
second approach in describing the method in this paper, as well. 
1.1. Organization of the paper 
The rest of the introduction provides an overview of the theorem proving method. 
Section 2 gives a formal description of the theorem prover. Section 3 describes in 
detail all the new mechanisms used by the theorem proving method. Section 4 gives 
an algorithm for implementing the method. (This section may be skipped at first 
reading especially if the reader is not interested in the details of the algorithm). 
Section 5 provides a discussion of how the output produced by the prover is to be 
interpreted, and a comparison of our method with other inductive theorem proving 
methods. Appendix A gives an illustration of the method on a couple of examples. 
1.2. An overview 
We begin by describing the problems encountered in using PROLOG for proving 
an inductive property by simply typing the property as a query into a PROLOG 
interpreter. We introduce the new mechanisms by illustrating how to overcome these 
problems, and then present the method informally. 
1.2.1. The problem of unbounded depth-jirst search strategy 
PROLOG, which uses a query-respond paradigm to communicate with its users, 
is capable of proving only existentially quantified properties. For example, consider 
proving the associativity property of the ‘append’ of two lists. 
VX, y, z, Ll,. . , L4[append(X, Y, Ll), append(L1, Z, L2), 
append( Y, Z, L3), append(X, L3, L4) 1 L2 = L4]. 
‘Append’ is defined as a predicate which checks whether its third argument is the 
concatenation of its first two arguments. The property is expressed as a PROLOG 
clause defining a predicate prop(X, Y, Z) as follows:2 
append([ I, L, L) 
append([Al Ll], L2, [Al L3]): - append(L1, L2, L3), 
prop(X, Y, Z) :- append(X, Y, Ll), append( Ll, Z, L2) 
append( Y, Z, L3), append(X, L3, L4), L2 = L4. 
’ The clause defining ‘prop’ and the property to be proved are not logically equivalent. However, the 
manner in which the goals are processed by our method makes this discrepancy inconsequential. More 
about this is discussed in Section 2.1. 
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The property cannot be proved by executing the query: 
:- prop( X, Y, 2) 
since PROLOG will only provide an instance (not necessarily the most general one) 
of the input variables X, Y, and 2 which satisfies the property. In some interpreters 
of PROLOG (such as the C-PROLOG [3]), it is possible to request another instantiation 
(if any) which also satisfies prop(X, Y, Z). Such a feature will not help in general 
when the domains of the variables are infinite. 
In order to deal with the problem of infinite domains, we use the notion of 
skolemization employed in refutational theorem proving. Henceforth a hatted vari- 
able, such as X, will be used to denote a skolem constant. A skolem constant is like 
a metavariable since it can denote an arbitrary value belonging to the domain under 
consideration. However, directly executing a (skolemized) goal such as 
:- prop( rZ, Y, 2) 
will not lead to a proof since the first subgoal, append(X, ?, Ll) does not match 
with any clause head. To solve the above problem we introduce a new concept 
called R-sufisjiubility, which is weaker than the standard notion of satisfiability of 
a goal in PROLOG. R-satisfiability gives us a way of handling unsatisfiable goals 
whose unsatisfiability is due to the appearance of skolem constants. For instance, 
consider the goal append( ?,Z, L3). The goal append( Y, 2, L3) is not satisfiable 
since ? unifies with neither [ ] nor [Al L]. However, we know that this goal should 
be satisfiable since ?, being a list, has to be either [ ] or [Al L] for some A and L. 
Therefore, we suspend the evaluation of this goal by treating it as being satisfied. 
The suspended state of the goal is recorded by binding L3 to a closure, called 
R-binding.’ The R-binding contains the constraint that L3 has to meet for the goal 
to succeed. In our notation, L3 is bound to a term ofthe form R(f3:append( ?,Z, /3)), 
where append( Y, 2, /3) is called the R-constraint of L3, and 13 is called the (bound) 
R-variable. A goal which can be satisfied in this way is called R-sutisjiuble. 
To fully characterize the notion of a-satisfiability, we need to take into consider- 
ation two other situations in which a goal that would normally fail (under PROLOG 
satisfiability) would have to succeed for our purpose. Both these situations occur 
when the failure of a goal is because some of its arguments have O-bindings. To 
see the first situation, consider the goal append(L1, 2, L2), where Ll is bound to 
a( Il:append(X, ?, 11)). We make this goal succeed by once again suspending the 
evaluation of this goal, and generating an R-binding for L2. Note that this goal 
has to be added as a new constraint to the currently existing O-bindings in the goal, 
and all the constraints in the currently existing R-bindings should be propagated 
to the new bindings generated. Thus, Ll is bound to O(Zl:append(X, ?, II), 
’ A similar notion has also been used by Kornfeld [16] for enriching the unification to include 
equational axioms. 
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append(Z1, 2, /2)) and L2 is bound to R(/2:append(X, ?, II), append(ll,& L2)). 
The second situation is illustrated by the following example. Consider the goal 
append([ 1, L3, L2), where L3 is bound to a( /3:append( ?, 2, /3)), and L2 is bound 
to 0(12:append( ?, 2, L2)). We would want this goal to succeed (although it would 
normally fail) because the bindings of L2 and L3 although structurally distinct 
impose the same constraint on the variables. We fix this problem by using 0- 
equivalence instead of PROLOG equivalence, which is structural identity, while 
comparing terms. Two R-terms are O-equivalent if they can be made identical upto 
renaming of the R-variables. On all other terms R-equivalence behaves just as 
PROLOG equivalence. 
By using R-satisfiability instead of ordinary PROLOG satisfiability the query: 
:-prw([ I, t 2) 
can be executed successfully. The constraint (in the a-bindings generated during 
the execution of ‘prop’) on which the success of the query depends is append( ?, 2, I). 
This constraint is guaranteed to be satisfied because (by our totality assumption 
about the predicates) there always exists such an I for arbitrary lists that 9 and 2 
denote. Thus, the successful execution of the above query proves the associativity 
property of ‘append’ for the case where X is [ 1. 
1.2.2. The problem of induction 
As illustrated above, if we use the notion of suspended evaluation in executing 
an appropriately skolemized goal, we would, in general, be left with an a-constraint 
at the end of a successful execution of the goal. The R-constraint is sometimes 
obviously true, as was the case in the situation shown above. But, sometimes it 
might denote a conjunction of goals that is implied by a smaller instance of the 
original goal that we were trying to satisfy. It is extremely useful to detect this 
situation since it could give us the induction hypothesis needed to complete the 
inductive step in the proof of the original goal. PROLOG cannot detect such an 
implication since it uses only backward chaining (deducing subgoals from a goal), 
but not forward chaining (deducing a goal from a set of subgoals). It is not hard, 
in principle, to incorporate general forward chaining into PROLOG by constantly 
checking the remaining of the subgoals to see if some of them satisfy a clause. But 
this is undesirable since it would be extremely inefficient. We deal with this problem 
by introducing a limited forward chaining mechanism. This consists of 
(1) using only the clause that describes the proposition to be proved for forward 
chaining, and 
(2) only attempting to perform forward chaining on the 0-constraint obtained 
at the end of a-satisfying all the goals in the body of the proposition clause. 
For instance, consider the execution of the query: 
:-prop([,4 i], 9,Z). (2) 
Assuming we are using a-satisfiability, the above query can be successfuly executed. 
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At the end of the execution the O-bindings generated will have the following 
constraint: 
append(i, ?, II), append(l1, 2, /2), append( ?, 2, /3), append(i, Z3, E4), 12 = Z4. 
By performing forward chaining on the above set of goals using the clause defining 
‘prop’, we have prop(i, ?,i) as the constraint on which the validity of 
prop([a] i], ?,i) is dependent. Combining the execution of the queries (1) and 
(2), we have established the validity of the following formulas which completes the 
proof of VX, Y, 2 prop(X, Y, 2): 
(1) t/Y, 2 prop([ I, Y, Zl, 
(2) VA, L, Y, Z bop(L, Y, Z) 1 PrwUAl Ll, Y 2)). 
Note that it might not always be possible to perform forward chaining on the 
R-constraint generated. In such a case the constraint is merely returned as a Lemma 
that has to be proved for establishing the validity of the proposition. 
1.2.3. The problem of skolemization 
In completing the proof (shown above) of ‘prop’, the skolem constants with which 
the variables X, Y, and Z were instantiated were chosen a priori. In the first case 
it was chosen to be ([ 1, 9, z), and in the second case it was ([a] i], 9, 2). Together 
they form a complete set of skolemizations because they completely span the domain 
under consideration, namely the triple product of List. While completeness of the 
set of skolemization is certainly necessary, it is also equally important to have the 
right kind of partitioning of the domain. For instance, the naive skolemization, such 
as (2, ?, 2) in the above example, in which every universally quantified variable 
is skolemized to a distinct unstructured constant is obviously complete but rarely 
leads to an inductive proof. For instance, execution of the query: 
:- prop(X, Y, 2) (3) 
will give prop(X, Y, 2) as the Lemma leading us back to where we began. 
The skolemization that is likely to lead to a proof is dependent on the inductive 
structure of the definition of the predicates in the proposition, and on the structure 
of the terms constructing the domain. To automate the generation of skolem constants 
in a way that takes into account the inductive structure, we introduce a mechanism 
called skolemization by need. In our theorem proving method bindings for the 
universally quantified variables are generated using the skolemization by need 
mechanism. 
Under this method, the universally quantified variables in a query start out as 
free variables (i.e., like any other variables in PROLOG) instead of being replaced 
by skolem constants (as was done in the proof of ‘prop’ shown above). This allows 
PROLOG unification to keep instantiating them until they are skolemized. A variable 
gets skolemized only (and immediately) after a decision about the value to be bound 
for that variable is made. We consider a decision to have been made when 
(1) the variable is unified with a nonvariable term, or 
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(2) the variable appears in a goal whose execution does not lead to any new 
subgoals. 
Note that the second situation may happen either because the goal was successfully 
matched with a fact, or because its evaluation was suspended by generating a- 
bindings. The fact that a variable X is skolemized is indicated by replacing every 
free variable in the term currently bound to X by its corresponding hatted skolem 
constant. 
For instance, the goal append(X, Y, Ll) where X and Y are universally quantified, 
would succeed when unified with the fact in the ‘append’ program; X would be 
bound to [ ] and Y (and hence also Ll) would be bound to a skolem constant 9 
(rather than a variable) since the goal does not generate any new subgoals. On the 
other hand if append(X, Y, Ll) were unified with the head of the second clause in 
the program for ‘append’, then X would get instantiated to [A 1 L]. X would then 
immediately get skolemized to [L 1 i] since [A 1 L] is a nonvariable term. The variable 
Y is not skolemized at this point since no decision needs to be made about its 
value; neither is Ll since it is not an input variable. 
When skolemization by need is used in conjunction with Q-satisfiability in 
executing a query, the response will not only be a Lemma (constructed from the 
on-constraint), but also the skolemization which was responsible for the Lemma. To 
obtain a complete set of skolemizations and the corresponding Lemmas, we use the 
backtracking mechanism of PROLOG by forcing a failure after an execution of the 
query. The totality restriction we impose on the definition of predicates guarantees 
that a complete set of skolemizations will be produced after a finite number of 
forced failure attempts of the query. (A justification of this is provided in Section 
3.5). For instance, the first execution of the query :- prop(X, Y, 2) would yield the 
skolemization ([ 1, ?, 2) and the lemma true. A forced failure would yield, after 
backtracking, the skolemization ([A 1 i], ?,2) and the Lemma prop(i, ?, 2). 
1.2.4. An outline of the method 
The properties (V_%+(X)) that our method is capable of proving have the general 
form of Horn clauses: 
f$(X): VZ(P,(X, Z) A. . * A P,(X, 2) 3 Q(X, 2)) 
where the P,‘s (the antecedents) are arbitrary predicates and Q (the consequent) is 
a literal representing some equality s = t. For convenience we shall use Q(X, 2) for 
the consequent throughout the paper instead of the literal s = t, even though Q is 
not a predicate symbol. We assume that X and 2 (lists of variables) are the only 
variables in the predicates, and that every variable in 2 appears in at least one of 
the antecedents. 
Our method consists of R-satisfying every Pi subjecting every variable in X to 
skolemization by need in the process. If any of the P,‘s cannot be R-satisfied, then 
the proposition is vacuously true because one of the antecedents is false. The 
mechanisms of R-satisfaction and skolemization by need (and the fact that every 
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variable in 2 appears in at least one of the antecedents) guarantee that no variable 
in x or 2 remains free at the end of R-satisfying all the antecedents. More 
specifically, the following conditions are guaranteed: 
(i) Every variable in x is skolemized. 
(ii) No variable in 2 is free; it is either bound to an O-term, or to a term that 
contains skolemized variables. 
After processing the antecedents, an attempt is made to O-satisfy Q(x, 2). Since 
none of the variables in Q is free, the outcome of such an attempt can be one of 
the following: 
(1) Q is satisfied under PROLOG satisfiability (with PROLOG equality extended to 
O-equivalence). In this case no new R-bindings are generated, nor any of the 
existing O-bindings are altered. 
(2) Q is R-satisfied by adding new constraints to the existing O-bindings. This 
happens when Q cannot be satisfied as in (1). In this case, according to the 
a-satisfiability mechanism, all the constraints in the current bindings will be merged, 
and Q will be included into the R-bindings as a new constraint. Thus, when Q 
cannot be satisfied as in (1) it will always become a part ofthe O-constraint generated. 
In the former case the proposition is proved for the present skolemization because 
the validity of the consequent was shown despite the constraints on which the 
validity of the antecedents is based. Hence, the literal true is returned as the Lemma. 
In the latter case, the validity of the proposition is dependent on the R-constraint. 
Note that the eventual R-constraint, although represented as a list of goals, itself 
denotes a Horn clause formula with the constraints generated from the Pi’s forming 
the antecedents and the constraint generated from Q forming the consequent. This 
formula is returned as the Lemma after checking whether it is an instance of 4. 
In both the cases, the skolemization generated for the variables in x is returned 
along with the Lemma. This takes care of the proof for the partition of the domain 
(of x) that is characterized by the skolemization. To complete the proof for the 
remaining parts of the domain, it is necessary to backtrack (undoing the skolemiz- 
ations in the process), and re-O-satisfy the goals in the proposition. The backtracking 
needed here is much like the one used by PROLOG, and will be explained later in 
the paper. 
2. Functional description of the prover 
2.1. Representation of the proposition 
The PROLOG data base that the theorem prover will operate on should include a 
description of the proposition to be proved, and a complete definition of all the 
predicates used in the proposition. In our formalism the proposition 4(z) 
4(X): VZ(P,(X, Z) A. . . A P,,(x, 2) 2 Q(x, 2)) 
to be proved is represented as a predicate prop(X) defined by the following PROLOG 
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clause: 
prop(X):- P,(X, Z), . . . , P,(X, Z), Q(X, 2). 
As a convention we refer to the variables in x as input variables. Note that 4 is 
not logically equivalent to the PROLOG clause. However, this discrepancy does not 
have any ill effect because ‘prop’ is only used as a means of representing the property 
to be proved, not as a predicate in any other clauses. Also, our method requires the 
antecedents be processed before the consequent. The left-to-right strategy used by 
PROLOG for processing and goals accomplishes this automatically when C,!J is rep- 
resented as ‘prop’. ‘prop’ thus defined also makes it convenient to check if the 
R-constraint generated is the inductive hypothesis by using this clause to perform 
forward chaining. 
2.2. Description of the arguments 
For ease of presentation, we introduce a new predicate ind_prove( Theorem, 
Premise, Lemma) to serve as the prover. To prove a proposition prop(X), the prover 
is invoked by ind_prove(prop(X), P, L). This would result in a single skolemization 
(in the form of instantiations for the variables in x), and a value for P and L. The 
rest of the skolemizations, and their correspondng premises and lemmas may be 
obtained through PROLOG backtracking. 
The arguments of ind_prove are described below: 
Theorem is the proposition to be proved. 
Premise is a list of conditions (predicates) on the skolem constants appearing in 
the skolemization generated for ??. When the list is empty, Premise is considered 
to be true; otherwise, it is considered as the conjunction of all the predicates in the 
list. A nontrivial Premise appears mostly when some predicate is defined condi- 
tionally. 
Lemma is also a list of conditions (or true) like Premise. These conditions 
determine the validity of the proposition being proved for the corresponding 
skolemization. The conditions in Lemma are interpreted in a way different from 
the Premise. If the list of conditions in Lemma is (A,, . . . , A,,,, Q’), where Q’ is an 
instance of the consequent Q, then its logical meaning is 
A,/,.. . A A, 1 Q’. 
Suppose {x,, . . , XL} is the set of all instantiations generated for x by repeated 
invocations of ind_prove(prop(X), Premise, Lemma). For each x,, let Pr;(Xj) be 
the premise and Lem,(X,) be the lemma produced by ind_prove. Let D, denote 
the domain of values, i.e., ground terms, over which x ranges. Then the outputs 
produced by ind_prove automatically satisfy the following conditions: 
(1) Well-spannedness: For every ground 6~ D,, there is some j such that d is 
an instance of x, and Pr, (d) is true. In other words, the set of instantiations well-spun 
(cf. [lo, 251) domain D,y. The use of Premise is for the possible splitting of cases 
in the domain. For example, given a proposition with two inputs A and L where 
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A is an atom and L is a list, the set of instantiations may be (A, [ I), (A, [B 1 L]), 
and (4 LB I LI), with premises respectively, true, A = B, and A # B. 
(2) Problem reduction: For each 6~ D, and for the proper instantiation and 
premise index j for which d satisfies (l), we have the property: 
if Lem;(d), then prop(d). 
Property (1) above describes a proper set of instantiations and property (2) 
indicates that, for a particular instance d, Lemj(d) has to be proved for prop(d) to 
be true. 
For the ‘append’ example, ind-prove would generate the following set of 
instantiations with the corresponding lemmas: 
Instantiation Premise Lemma 
(r I, Y, a true true 
([A I Ll, Y, -3 prw(L, Y, Z) 
This means that 
(1) VU, Z prop([ I, Y, ZL 
(2) VA, L, Y, Zb-w(L, Y, Z) 1 prop([A I Ll, Y, Z)). 
Since prop( L, Y, Z) is the induction hypothesis of prop([Al L], Y, Z), we have 
proved VX, Y, Z prop(X, Y, Z), and therefore ‘append’ is associative. 
3. The new mechanisms 
This section gives a detailed description of all the newly introduced mechanisms 
which form the building blocks for our theorem proving method. 
3.1. Skolemization by need 
This mechanism provides a systematic way of skolemizing the input variables in 
the proposition.This method of skolemization is distinguished from the conventional 
methods in that the variables are not skolemized at the start of the resolution process. 
Instead, every input variable is left unskolemized (so that it can get instantiated by 
the unification of PROLOG) until a decision about its value has to be made. At this 
point the input variable is skolemized by simply hatting every variable occurring 
in the term currently bound to the input variable. We consider such a decision about 
an input variable to have been made when 
(1) the variable is unified with a nonvariable term, or 
(2) the variable appears in a goal whose execution does not lead to any new 
subgoal. Note that this situation may occur either because the goal was successfully 
matched with a fact, or because its evaluation was suspended for generating R- 
bindings. 
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As an example, if the first subgoal append(X, Y, Ll), where X and Y are input 
variables, is unified with the head of the second clause in the definition of ‘append’ 
(Section 1.2.1), append([A 1 Ll], L2, [A 1 L3]), then the variable X will be instantiated 
to [Al L]. Then, X would be immediately skolemized to [al i] by hatting the 
variables A and L. The variable Y is not skolemized yet because no decision about 
its value is made. On the other hand, let us suppose the input variable Y appears 
in a goal append( L2, Y, L3), in which L2 has an a-binding (see next section). Then 
this goal would be a-satisfied without creating any subgoals, and hence Y would 
be skolemized to ? 
3.2. R-SatisJiability and O-binding 
0-satisfiability is a notion of satisfiability weaker than the one used in PROLOG. 
It is used primarily to handle the failure of a goal that arises because some of the 
variables in the goal are skolemized. We define R-satisfiability so that a goal would 
succeed in such a situation by generating a special kind of binding, called an 
O-binding, for the free variables in the goal. Before describing how a-bindings are 
generated we need to introduce some definitions. 
An fin-term is a term ofthe form R(x:P) where x is a variable, called the R-variable, 
and P is a (conjunction of) predicate(s), called the O-constraint. A variable X is 
R-bound to t if t is an o-term or it is a term containing an R-term as a subterm. 
If a variable X is bound to [a 1 fi(Z:P( ?, z), Q(z, Q)], it means that X is bound to 
the list [a 1 L] where L is a list satisfying P( Y, Z) A Q(Z, L) for some Z. (Note that 
in our method an input variable will never be a-bound.) 
The purpose of a-binding is to treat certain unsatisfiable goals as constraints, 
which may eventually become part of the Lemma or Premise. From now on we use 
the word o-term loosely to mean either an R-term as defined above or any term 
that contains an o-term. 
Definition. Two R-terms t, and t2 are f&equivalent (denoted as t, = R t2) if they are 
identical upon renaming of the o-variables. 
For example, l+fl(n:P( ?, n)) and l+n( m:P( ?, m)) are o-equivalent, while 
l+n(n:P(?,n)) and l+O(m:Q(~m)) are not (even if P and Q can be proven 
tobeequivalentbyothermeans),norare l+f2(n:P(k,n))andl+fI(m:P(tm)). 
Definition. Let P( t, , . . . , t,) be an arbitrary goal, where the t,‘s are either R-terms, 
constants, skolem constants, or free variables. Then, P is f%satisJable if one of the 
following holds: 
(1) P unifies with a clause head provided a skolemized variable in P is allowed 
to be instantiated. 
(2) Condition (1) does not hold, but P can be satisfied in PROLOG with the 
PROLOG equality extended to include R-equivalence. 
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(3) The goal cannot be satisfied as in (2), and at least one of the variables in P 
is skolemized or a-bound. 
For example, if “G(X, [a IX]).” is a PROLOG fact, then the goal 
G(fl(m:P(~,m)),[a~f2(n:P(~n))]) is O-satisfiable since the goal and the fact 
match and O(m:P( 9, m)) =IIO(n:P( ?, n)). Note that conditions (1) and (3) above 
represent situations in which a potential failure of a goal is caused because of the 
existence of a skolemized variable in the goal. 
3.2.1. O-binding generation 
a-bindings will occur as a ‘side-effect’ when a goal P( t, , . . . , t,,) gets O-satisfied 
as per the conditions (1) and (3) in the definition above. In such a case, the binding 
of every non-input variable in P(t,, . . . , t,) will be changed according to the 
following rules. (Note that skolemization by need requires that all unskolemized 
input variables be skolemized at such a juncture.) The R-binding generated for a 
variable indicates the constraint that the variable ought to satisfy. 
Case 1: At least one argument of P( t, , . . . , t,) is a free non-input variable. There 
are two subcases. Without any loss of generality, let us assume that t, is the only 
free non-input variable X. If there are more than one free non-input variables in 
P, then a similar action will take place on each of them. 
Case l(a): None of the arguments of P( t,, . . , t,_, , X) is R-bound. In this case 
we consider the goal P( t, , . . . , t,_, , X) satisfied by simply binding X to the O-term 
O(x:P(t,,..., t,_, , x)). Every non-input free variable in P is bound to an a-term 
in a similar way. It is not hard to see that each O-term generated here will have 
the same O-constraint. 
Case l(b): Some arguments of P(t,, . , tn-,, X) are already a-bound. In 
this case, X is bound to an O-term which is obtained by merging the O-terms of 
all the R-bound variables of t? Without any loss of generality, let us assume 
t,, . . , tk are free input variables and each of tk+,, . . , t, is O-bound to a term 
of the form O(y,:C,). Then, X is bound to the term O(x:C), where the constraint 
C is 
CkI,U. ’ ’ u cn u {P(t,, . . . , k, yk+l, . . . , y,, xl>, 
For example, consider P(fl(u:R(u, ?)), [ai fl(l:Q(& l))], X) (that is, a predicate 
P( U, [ff 1 L], X) with U and L bound to n-terms). Suppose this goal is R-satisfiable 
according to either condition (1) or (3) given in the definition above. Then, X gets 
bound to (fi(x:R(u, ?), Q(.$ I), P[u, [All], x)). As in Case l(a) every free non- 
input variable should be O-bound similarly. 
Case 2: There is no non-input free variable in the arguments of P( t,, . . . , t,). 
Case 2(a): None of the arguments of P is R-bound. This can happen only when 
all the arguments of P are either constant or skolem constant from the input variables. 
In this case no R-binding is generated since there are no free variables to be bound. 
However, P still denotes a condition which this particular instantiation of the input 
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variables must satisfy. Such conditions will become part of the Premise or Lemma 
as described in Section 3.3. 
Case 2(b): Some arguments are R-bound. In this case an o-merging, as described 
in Case l(b), needs to be performed, and all the a-bound variables should have 
their R-constraints changed accordingly. Once again we describe this process by 
an example. Suppose the o-unsatisfiable goal is G(M, N) where M + 
O(m:P(?,m)) and N+[alR(n:Q(?,n))]. In order to prevent this goal from 
failing, we rebind the values of M and N and add G as part of the new constraints. 
That is, M should be R-bound to n(m:P( ?, m), Q( 9, n), G(m, [a 1 n])) and N to 
[a 1 i2( n: P( ?, n), Q( 9, m), G( m, [a 1 n])). Note that, in additon to the new constraint 
G, both of the Q-constraints of the original bindings of M and N are now a part 
of the new R-constraints. Also note that G(m, [a 1 n]), instead of G(m, n), is part 
of the new constraint since N was originally bound to [u I R (n : . )]. 
We now apply this R-binding mechanism to the second subgoal, append( t Z, L2) 
of the ‘append’ example. append( ?, Z, L2) is not R-satisfiable since ? can unify 
with neither [ ] nor [Al L]. When invoking the R-binding procedure, Z is auto- 
matically hatted and becomes 2. It is clear that Case l(a) applies here since L2 is 
a free variable. Therefore, to ‘satisfy’ this goal, we assign R(I,:append( ?, 2, I,)) 
to L2. 
3.3. Premise and Lemma generations 
Both premise and lemma are lists of constraints arising out of suspension of 
subgoals while the goals in ‘prop’ are a-satisfied. Note that suspended goals are 
converted into constraints via the a-binding mechanism. Every constraint so gener- 
ated will end up exclusively as a part of either the premise or the lemma. 
A premise is constructed by collecting all the (sub)goals that fall under Case 2(a) 
during the R-binding generation while the antecedents are being R-satisfied. Note 
that a goal will fall under Case 2(a) only when every variable in it is already 
skolemized. Hence, a premise represents conditions to be assumed on the skolemiz- 
ation of the input variables. An empty premise is considered to be true. 
A lemma is intended to denote the formula on which the validity of the proposition 
being proved depends. Hence it is constructed after R-satisfying the consequent. 
The outcome of R-satisfying the consequent can either be produced through R- 
binding generation or without. In the latter case, the lemma constructed is the literal 
true because this means that the consequent can be satisfied regardless of the 
constraints upon which the validity of the antecedents depended. In the other case 
(when n-binding is employed), the consequent should have fallen under Case 2(a) 
or 2(b) during R-binding generation. Then the lemma is either an instance of the 
consequent (produced by Case 2(a)), or the 0-constraint of an a-bound variable 
of the consequent subgoal (produced by Case 2(b)). Note that since the R-constraints 
produced from Case 2(b) are the same for all the o-bound variables (the only 
difference being the R-variables), the lemma produced is unique. 
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Getting back to the ‘append’ example, there are two instantiations for the variables 
(X, Y, Z), namely ([ 1, ?, 2) and ([Al X], ?, 2). Neither of them produces any 
premise (i.e., every subgoal from the antecedents can be satisfied by O-binding). 
So what remains is to satisfy the consequent, L2 = L4. 
In the first case determined by the instantiation ([ 1, ?,2), L2 and L4 ate bound 
to, respectively, 
fl(Z,:append( t 2, Z2)) and n(Z,:append( ?, 2, Z,)). 
Since O(Z,:append( ?,2, Z,) =n O(Z,:append( ?,z, ZJ), the goal L2 = L4 is KZ- 
satisfied. Therefore, the lemma is true. 
In the second instantiation ([A 1 T?], 9, z), L2 and L4 are bound to, respectively, 
[al R(Z,:append(X, Y, Z,), append(Z,, 2, &))I 
and 
[al n(Z,:append( ?, 2, Z3), append(X, Zj, ZJ)]. 
The consequent L2 = L4 is not a-satisfiable since 
KZ(Z,:append(X, ?, I,), append(Z,, 2, ZJ) f, O(Z,:append( ?, 2, Z3), 
append(X, Z,, ZJ). 
Therefore, Case 2(b) applies and the bindings of L2 and L4 now become 
L,+[alfi(Z,:append(X, t I,), append(Z,, 2, ZJ, 
append(? 2 Z3), append(X, Z,, ZJ, Z2 = Ml 
L,+-[alfl(Z,:append(X, Y,Z,),append(Z,,&ZJ, 
append( t 2, ZA append(X, Zs, ZJ, Z2 = L)l. 
The lemma should, therefore, be 
(append(X, ?, Ll) A append( Ll, 2, L2) A append( ?, 2, L3) 
A append(X, L3, L4)) 1 L2 = L4, 
produced from the O-constraint of either L2 or L4. 
3.4. Limited forward chaining 
The only purpose of using forward chaining in our method is to produce the 
possible induction hypotheses of the original proposition. Therefore, the forward 
chaining facility in our prover is very restricted. The idea is the following: Suppose 
the Premise and the Lemma for some instantiation Xi are {C,, . . . , C,} and 
(0,) . . . , D,, Q}, where Q is an instance of the original consequent.4 The set 
{C,, . . , C,, D,, . . . , D,, Q} is checked against the body of the PROLOG clause 
which defines the orignal proposition (‘prop’ in the ‘append’ example). If it is an 
4 It is easy to see, from the construction of Lemma, that an instance of the consequent must be in the 
lemma if the lemma is not the literal true. 
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instantiation of a superset of the clause body, then prop(X;) is returned as the 
Lemma. (The Premise remains the same.) For instance in the second instantiation, 
([a] X], t Z), of the ‘append’ example, the lemma 
{(append(X, ?, Ll), append(Ll,Z, L2), 
append( ?, 2, L3), append(X, L3, L4), L2 = L4) 
matches with the body of the clause for prop(X, Y, 2) with X bound to 2, Y to 
9, and Z to Z. Therefore, prop(X, ?, 2) is returned as the new Lemma, replacing 
the previous one. Since this lemma prop(X, ?, 2) is produced when trying to satisfy 
the goal prop([A 1 k], ?, z), it is the induction hypothesis in the obvious structural 
induction of lists. 
3.5. Generating a well-spanned set of instantiations 
The concepts described above will guarantee that all the initial subgoals (the 
goals in the clause body of prop(X, Y, Z)) will be successfully processed and one 
instantiation will be generated for each of the input variables. However, our goal 
is to show that the proposition is true for all possible instances of the input variables. 
Therefore we need a mechanism to find more instantiations (and reprocess the initial 
set of subgoals) until the domains of the input variables are completely covered. 
This is done by backtracking to selected choice points. 
First we call a choice point (i.e., the point where the PROLOG execution does an 
or-split) a marked choice point if either 
(1) some of the input variables are instantiated (to a nonvariable term) when 
matching the clause head or one of the subgoals in the clause body, or 
(2) one of the goals of the clause body becomes a premise. In other words, a 
marked choice point is a backtracking point at which a different choice of the clause 
to match may result in different instantiations (skolemizations) for the input vari- 
ables. 
As mentioned before, an instantiation along with a premise and lemma is generated 
when we finish processing all the initial subgoals in the proposition. Then our 
method of generating another instantiation is to force a failure at this point and 
re-evaluate the input predicate ind_prove again. Our failure forcing mechanism is 
similar to the one in PROLOG for generating a second solution. The difference, 
however, is that in our case the theorem prover backtracks to the last marked choice 
point, but not to the last choice point as in PROLOG. The well-spannedness of the 
set of instantiations thus generated can be checked effectively [17,27]. The well- 
spannedness property is guaranteed in the case of abstract data types if the operations 
which the predicates represent are totally defined. 
4. An algorithmic description 
The algorithm below shows the generation of a single instantiation for the input 
(i.e., the universally quantified) variables in the proposition, a Lemma and a Premise 
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for that particular instantiation. To generate a well-spanned set of instantiations, it 
is necessary to backtrack, as described before, the algorithm to the latest marked 
choice point, and re-execute the algorithm by choosing a different clause/fact to 
unify a (sub)goal. 
We have used an algorithmic notation (rather than a PROLOG notation) to keep 
it free of PROLOG idiosyncrasies. The text within braces is intended to be treated 
as comments. The symbol + should be treated as an operation that binds the value 
of the expression on the right-hand side to the variable on the left-hand side. 
Ind_Prove(Prop(X), Premise, Lemma) 
Body + body of the clause that unifies with Prop(X) 
Antecedentscall but the last element of Body 
Consequent + the last element of Body 
Premise + empty list 
Lemma + empty list 
Processgoals(Antecedents, Premise) 
Processconseq( Consequent, Lemma) 
end {Ind_Prove}. 
Processgoals( Goals, Premise) 
{Goals is a list of goals to be processed.} 
{Premise is a list of constraints on input variables.} 
{Processgoals processes every goal in Goals, skolemizing the input 
variables when necessary, and generating constraints or O-bindings 
when a goal is not satisfiable.} 
{The constraints generated are also asserted in the data base.} 
if not empty(Goals) then 
G c first( Goals) 
Goals + rest( Goals) 
case G is 
a successfully evaluable built-in predicate: 
Evaluate G 
Skolemize all free input variables in G 
Processgoals( Goals, Premise) 
not unifiable with any of the clause heads: 
Skolemize all free input variables in G 
Generate_fLbinding( G, Premise) 
Processgoals( Goals, Premise) 
{Note: Generation of premises and their assertion into the 
data base are done inside Generate-O-bindings.} 
unifiable with a head provided a skolemized variable in G can 
be instantiated: 
Take the same action as in the previous case 
unifiable with a fact: 
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Unify G 
Skolemize all free input variables in G 
Processgoals( Goals, Premise) 
otherwise: 
Unify G with the clause head 
Skolemize all variables that appear in terms that got 
bound (due to unification) to the input variables in G 
Goals + append(body of the clause G was unified with, Goals) 
Processgoals( Goals, Premise) 
end case 
fi 
end{ Processgoals} 
Processconseq( Consequent, Lemma) 
if Consequent is R_ satisfiable without altering the binding 
then Lemma + true 
else 
Generate_lR_bindings( Consequent, Lemma) 
Add to Lemma the O-constraint of an R-binding (if any) in 
Consequent 
fi 
end { Processconseq}. 
Generate_&bindings( G( t, , . . . , t,), Constraints) 
case G( t,, . . . , t,) is such that 
at least one of its arguments is a free non-input variable: 
case G( t, , . . . , t,) is such that 
none of its arguments is O-bound: 
Bind every free non-input variable in G( t,, . . , t,) 
to an R-term generated as described before 
some of its arguments are R-bound: 
Modify all O-bindings in the goal by performing R-merging 
as described before 
end case 
there is no free non-input variable in its arguments: 
case G( t,, . . . , t,) is such that 
none of its arguments is O-bound: 
Add G(t,, . . . , t,) to the list currently bound to Constraints 
Assert G( t, , . . , t,) as a new fact in the data base 
some of its arguments are O-bound: 
Modify all R-bindings in the goal by performing O-merging 
and adding the goal to the R-constraint 
end case 
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end case 
end {Generate_fi_bindings}. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Interpreting the outcome of Ind_Prove 
Let xi be an instantiation returned by the theorem prover, with the corresponding 
Premise Prem(X,) : A,, . . . , Ak and Lemma Lem(X,): B,, . . . , B,, Q, where Q is (an 
instance of) the original consequent. Then the logical meaning of the outcome is 
(A,(X,) A. . . A Ak(X,)) 3 (B,(X,, 2) A. . . A B,(J?,, 2) z~Q(x,, 2)) 
where all the free variables in the predicates are universally quantified. 
One of the following situations is applicable to every set of lemma (Lem), premise 
(Prem), and instantiation (xi) returned by ind_prove. 
(1) Lem is the literal true or Prem 3 Lem. 
(2) Lem has the form of prop(Xi) such that xi<xi under some well-founded 
ordering < on terms. 
(3) Lem is a false sentence. 
(4) Lem is a proposition which does not fall into any of the above cases. 
If every set of output returned by ind_prove in proving prop(X) falls into either 
case (1) or case (2), then prop(X) is true for all _%. Note that every instance of case 
(2) constitutes an induction step in the proof. Cases (1) and (2) are handled 
automatically by the procedure ind-prove. 
Case (4) deals with the situation when the lemma generated from an instantiation 
is neither (obviously) true nor in the form of some induction hypothesis. In this 
case we can formulate a new proposition, and try to prove its correctness by invoking 
ind_prove on the new proposition. The new proposition to be proved can be 
constructed in a standard way from the lemma and premise as follows: 
newprop( Y) :- Prem( Y), Lem( Y, 2). 
Note that the input variables for ‘newprop’ should include all the free variables 
in xi, which may be different from those in x. (Note that all the hatted variables 
in x, should be included in the list Y in ‘newprop’.) Also, the consequent subgoal 
of ‘newprop’ is the last subgoal of Lem(X,, 2). 
Currently, in our system the construction of the new proposition is done manually. 
This process can be automated by treating the theorem prover as a problem reduction 
theorem prover and treat each invocation of ind-prove as one level of the problem 
reduction mechanism. In other words, for each level, ind_prove reduces the present 
proposition to (a set of) lemmas, which in turn become new propositions for the 
next level. This can be done indefinitely until all lemmas are either obviously true, 
false, or are inductive hypotheses of some kind. In order to reduce the number of 
levels needed, we may incorporate some ‘linear’ substrategies, such as the Boolean 
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reduction strategy in [7], for quickly checking tautologies. Note that if every instance 
of case (4) is proved successfully and the only other output situations fall under 
cases (1) and (2), then prop(X) is true for all x. 
Case (3) corresponds to the situation in which the lemma returned is false. In 
general, in such a situation we cannot come to any conclusion about the truth or 
falsity of prop(X,). We have found, however, that in several examples it is possible 
to interpret in such a situation the outcome in a more useful way. More work needs 
to be done in this area. 
5.2. A remark on R-satisfiability 
In PROLOG, a goal is satisfied if it can be deduced to nothing but facts in the 
data base. The notion of 0-satisfiability is different from PROLOG satisfiability in 
that we have extended PROLOG equality between terms to fin-equivalence. In order 
to construct more effective lemmas, we also include the list of premises in the data 
base as PROLOG facts (as shown in the algorithm in Section 4). This will not change 
the soundness of the method since 
(1) the premises do not contain any variables; they contain only constants and 
skolem constants (hatted variables); therefore, no new bindings will be created from 
using these premises; 
(2) by the logical meaning of the lemma generated, the condition Premise 1 
Lemma needs to be verified for the proposition to be true; since the premise is 
already part of the antecedent of the condition, using them as assertions (or say 
PROLOG facts) for generating the lemma does not have the effect of adding new 
axioms. 
5.3. More on generating lemmas 
As mentioned before, the marked choice points are used while backtracking for 
finding new instantiations of the input variables. The choice points that are left 
unmarked, however, are not used in our current system. Backtracking through some 
of these unmarked choice points (those that occur after the last marked choice 
point) may result in different lemmas for the same instantiation. Although this 
feature is not yet in our system, it is not hard to incorporate it and produce a lemma 
which is a disjunction of all the lemmas produced from these unmarked choice 
points. The lemma so produced is weaker than the one from our original system 
(and thus presumably easier to verify). The disadvantage is that it may no longer 
be in Horn clause form. 
5.4. Comparison 
Proving inductive properties is considered one of the most difficult problems in 
automated theorem proving. To the authors’ knowledge, two of the more successful 
methods that deal with this problem are the Boyer-Moore method [l] and the 
inductive term rewriting method [6, 10,211. 
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A major difference between our method and that of Boyer-Moore is that our 
method is PaoLoc-based as opposed to being LISP-based. Another significant 
difference is that we use unification on clause heads to find proper instantiations, 
as opposed to an artificial split of nil and cons. Therefore our method can be applied 
naturally to data types other than lists (see [9] for examples). Nor do we explicitly 
use an EVAL operator. Our methods of generating lemmas (as well as the separation 
of Premise and Lemma) are also different. On the other hand, the Boyer-Moore 
method has many powerful features, such as generalizations, which ours does not. 
Recently, there has been some effort [13] to develop a verification system for 
proving PROLOG programs along the same lines that the Boyer-Moore system serves 
to verify LISP programs. Using techniques from natural deduction, [13] extend 
PROLOG'S execution mechanism to handle an extended set of (non-Horn clause) 
formulas. In their system, induction is not automated completely. To carry out an 
inductive proof one has set up formulas denoting the basis and the inductive cases 
manually. Their system can then be used to verify the formulas so constructed. 
Recently, [12] have proposed a method of automatically generating induction 
formulas that can be used in conjunction with [13]. 
The term rewriting method was first developed to solve equational problems in 
universal algebra [ 151. In the mid-70s the method was employed by the researchers 
in abstract data types and became a useful tool that linked the programming language 
community and the theorem proving community. (PROLOG is an example of another 
application of theorem proving to programming language design.) In recent years 
the term rewriting method has been extended to prove (equational) inductive 
properties of data types without using induction implicitly by building the inductive 
step into the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure. Although the inductive reasoning 
ability of the inductive rewriting method is less powerful than the Boyer-Moore 
method, it seems more efficient when it is applicable, and it also provides a uniform 
environment for program development as well as verification (e.g., OBJ [5]). The 
rewriting method has also been generalized to richer theories [ 1 l] and to first-order 
theories in general [8, 191 and, thus, is no longer restricted to proving just equations. 
However, despite these extensions and more recent developments in conditional 
term rewriting methods [ 14, 19,241, the term rewriting approach still cannot handle 
conditional definitions of data types (or, non-unit equations in first-order theory 
with equality) completely. 
The following is a simple example [2]: 
DeJine: f(x, Y) = if x =Y then g(x, Y) 
else g(x, x). 
Prove: Ax, Y) = g(x, x). 
The conditional rewriting methods of Remy and others (e.g., [19]) cannot prove 
the above statement even if the domain of x and y has a canonical term rewriting 
system (Remy’s method gives a complete solution to the ground case). 
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Our inductive theorem proving method, being based on PROLOG, can also be 
used as a program environment for program development and verification [9]. 
Compared to the rewriting appraoch, our method can handle conditions more 
effectively since it is not equation-based. We illustrate this point by solving the 
above example using our method: We use F and G for the relations corresponding 
to f and g. The program for F is: 
F(X, Y, 2) :-X = Y, G(X, Y, Z).’ 
F(X, Y, 2) :-X # y, G(X, X, Z). 
and the proposition to be proved is: 
prop(X, Y) :- F(X, Y, Zl), G(X, X, Z2), Zl = 22. 
The prover yields 
Instantiation Premise Lemma 
(X, X) true true 
(X Y) XfY true 
Since the instantiations well-span the domain of X and Y, the proposition is correct. 
Appendix A. Examples 
A.1. Illustration of the append example 
In the following we show how the theorem proving method produces a lemma 
and a premise for one of the instantiations, ([A IT?], ?, z), of the input variables 
by providing a step by step illustration of the method on the proof of the associativity 
property of ‘append’ for the inductive case. The other instantiation, ([ 1, ?, Z), is 
considerably easier to handle and will not be done here. We illustrate the processing 
of every goal that is considered during the proof process with one step corresponding 
to a single goal. At each step we indicate (as appropriate) the list of goals (the first 
of which is the current goal) remaining to be satisfied, a brief description of the 
action taken, the case applicable (Section 3.3) within the a-binding generation 
conditions and any change that occurs in the bindings of the variables. 
(1) append([ I, L, L). 
(2) append([Al Ll], L2, [Al L3]):-append(L1, L2, L3). 
prop(X, Y, Z) :- append(X, Y, Ll), append(L1, Z, L2) 
append( Y, Z, L3), append(X, L3, L4), L2 = L4. 
Initialization 
Antecedents + [append(X, Y, Ll), append(L1, Z, L2), 
append( Y, Z, L3), append(X, L3, L4)] 
Consequent + L2 = L4. 
5 This program is more complicated than what a PROLOG programmer will actually do. 
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Processing of the antecedents 
Goals: [append(X, Y, Ll), append(Ll,Z, L2), append( Y, 2, L3), 
append(X, L3, L4)] 
How the current goal is processed: unifies with clause (2) 
Bindings of variables: 
X+[Alrz], Llt[AlLS] 
Goals: [append(k, Y, L5), append(L1, 2, L2), append( Y, 2, L3), 
append(X, L3, L4)] 
How the current goal is processed: fails to unify 
Case applicable for O-binding generation: l(a) 
Bindings of variables 
Y+ P, L5+R(ZS:append($ ?, 15)) 
Goals: [append( Ll, Z, L2), append( Y, 2, L3), append(X, L3, L4)] 
How the current goal is processed: unifies with clause (2) 
Bindings of variables: 
L2+[Al L6] 
Goals: [append( L5,Z, L6), append( Y, Z, L3), append(X, L3, L4)] 
How the current goal is processed: fails to unify 
Case applicable for a-binding generation: l(b) 
Bindings of variables: 
z&, L5 + 0(/5:append($ ?, /5), append( /5,$ /6)), 
L6 t a( /6:append(k, t /5), append( IS, 2, Z6)) 
Goals: [append ( Y, 2, L3), append(X, L3, L4)] 
How the current goal is processed: fails to unify 
Case applicable for n-binding generation: l(a) 
Bindings of variables: 
L3 + 0(/3:append( k 2, /3)) 
Goals: [append( X, L3, L4)] 
How the current goal is processed: unifies with clause (2) 
Bindings of variables: 
L4+[A] L7] 
Goals: [append(g, L3, L7)] 
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How the current goal is processed: fails to unify 
Case applicable for O-binding generation: l(b) 
Bindings of variables: 
L7c R(/7:append( ?, 2,13), append(2, 13, /7)) 
L3 + R(/3:append( ?, 2, /3), append($ 13, /7)). 
Processing the consequent 
Goals: [ L2 = L4] 
How the current goal is processed: not R-satisfiable 
Case applicable for a-binding generation: 2(b) 
Bindings of variables: 
L7 + a( /7:append(k, ?, /5), append( /5,2, /6), append( ?,.?, /3), 
append($/3, /7), /6 = /7) 
L6 c O(f6:append(k, ?, /5), append( /5,216), append( ?, 2, /3), 
append(2, 13, /7), /6 = 17) 
Premise + true 
Lemma + (append($ 9, /5), append(f5,$ /6), append( ?,2, Z3), 
append(g,l3, /7), 16 = /7) 
+ prop( rz, 9, z,. 
A.2. A tree example 
In this example we present two versions of the membership relation of a tree 
(‘isin’). The first one treats a tree as an abstract object constructed from two 
constructors, ‘emptytree” and ‘mktree”. The second one treats a tree as a flat list. 
‘isin’ takes a tree and an element as arguments and determines whether the element 
is in the tree. 
The abstract tree 
isin(emptytree, E, false). 
isin(tree( L, N, R), N, true), 
isin(tree(L, N, R), E, B):- N # E, isin( L, E, Bl), isin(R, E, B2), 
B=or(Bl, B2). 
The list tree 
EMPTYTREE([ 1, [ I). 
MKTREE([ 1, N, R, [N 1 RI). 
MKTREE([X / L], N, R, [X 1 T]):-MKTREE( L, N, R, T). 
ISIN([ 1, X, false). 
rsr~([X 1 L], X, true). 
ISIN([XIL], Y, B):-Xf Y,ISIN(& Y, B). 
The first tree can be considered as an abstraction of ‘isin’ in the data type Tree, 
and the second one can be considered as an implementation. Both of them are 
executable PROLOG programs, nevertheless. 
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We want to show that the ISIN described in the second tree is the same as the 
‘isin’ in the first tree. To put it informally, we want to prove that 
if isin (tree(L, N, R), E, Bl) and 
MKTREE(&N, R, T) and ISIN(T,E,B~), 
then Bl = B2. 
First note that the above description does indeed fit into the Horn clause formalism 
required for the propositions to be proved. Since MKTREE is defined in three different 
clauses, one proposition needs to be established for each. They are 
propo( T, E) :- EMPTYTREE([ 1, T), ISIN( T, E, B), B = fake. 
propl(l, N, R, N) :- MKTREE(L, N, R, T), ISIN( T, N, B), B = true. 
prop2(1, N, R, E):- N # E, ISIN(L, E, Bl), ISIN(R, E, B2), 
B = or(B1, B2), 
MKTREE(& N, R, T), ISIN(T,C), 
B = C. 
The more interesting case is prop2, and the set of instantiations, with premises 
and lemmas, generated by ind-prove is the following: 
Instantiations Premise LU?ll?lU ^ ^ 
L+[ ],N+N,E+E 
(a) R+[ 1 iii#lC true 
(b)R+[i.II?] k#E true 
(c)R+[?lk] !+#E,P#E true 
Lt[ili], Ntfi, E+i 
(a) R+[ 1 iii#E true 
(b) R+[ilk] iii#E true 
(c) R+[?Ik] fiZ.6 true 
1 A 
Lt[XIL], N-,6, Eti 
(a) R+[ 1 true 
(b) R+[?lk] T?#IC 
prw2(<, t, I I, 2) 
prop2(L N [ ?I iI, E) 
(c) Rt[Ejd] /?#k,k#i TRl:E(L*, ft’,[gli], L), ISIN(L, i, B), 
B = true 
The last instantiation has an unresolvable lemma. As described before, the lemma 
can be converted into a new proposition which will be further proved by the same 
method. In this particular problem, the new proposition is: 
newprop(l, N, R, E) :- N # E, TREE(& N, [E 1 R], M), 
ISIN(M, E, B), B = true. 
The proof generated by ind-prove for it is 
Instantiations Premise Lemma 
(1) newrop([ I, I;: k g) true true 
(2) newprop([g 1 i], l;i, it, B) true newprop(i, I;! I?, 6) 
Another interesting characteristic of our method can be seen from this example. 
Note that the prover partitions, automatically, the domain into nine parts: 
P’OPN I, N, 1 I, E) P~oP~([ I, N, [E I RI, E) prop2([ I, N, [ YI RI, E) 
proG([E I Ll, N, 1 I, E) P~oP~([E I Ll, N [E I RI, E) prop2([E/Ll,N,[YIRl,E) 
Pw’UX I Ll, N, [ I, E) P~oPUXI Ll, N, LE RI, E) prop2([Xl Ll, N, [VI RI, E) 
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instead of the usual three-part partition. This is because our prover partitions 
domains according to how the predicates are defined and not simply to the structure 
of the data type. 
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